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OPINION
H
ere is an interesting story: The pace of personal
bankruptcies rose quickly during the 1990s, even
as the overall economy fared well. What might 
we conclude from these facts? One possibility is that
improvements in financial intermediation have made 
credit-granting decisions easier and have led to greater 
borrowing by risky groups previously denied credit. Another
is that nothing has changed in the lending industry, yet
households anticipated rapid future income growth. 
This led them to borrow, but for those whose income failed
to grow as expected, default proved useful, leading overall
bankruptcy rates to rise. Still another explanation is 
that neither lender behavior nor income expectations have
changed, but instead that there is no longer any “shame” 
in defaulting on debts.
Each of these explanations may partially account for 
the facts, and some may fail altogether. But interpreting 
historical behavior and predicting future patterns first
requires a theory about how consumers make financial 
decisions. What are people considering when they choose
how much to spend, how much to borrow, and how much to
save? By themselves, the data tell us little.
Modern economics develops theories in the form 
of mathematical models of household and firm decision-
making in which their collective behavior is required to be
consistent with the feasibility requirements imposed by the
model. This is known as an “equilibrium” approach.
Equilibrium analysis may be clearly contrasted with 
an alternative still prevalent in consumer finance, one 
that places far less emphasis on modeling explicit 
decisionmaking. The latter approach instead relies on sum-
marizing observed features of the data, usually using
regression analysis, and treating the correlations as being
informative for the effects of policy.
Why should we not simply stare at data, perform a 
purely statistical analysis, and hope to learn from the results?
Ever since the publication of Robert Lucas’ seminal work in
the 1970s, economists have become sensitive to the pitfalls
of using history to learn about the effects of future 
policies, especially those that are novel and far-reaching.
The so-called “Lucas critique” pointed out that many 
relationships between economic variables which appeared
structural, or immutable, actually were the products of past
policies and thus subject to change as policies changed.
Lucas’ work forced economists to push expectations to the
forefront of consumption research.
The argument is simple and powerful. If what we see 
in the data is to be usefully interpreted as the outcome of
purposeful decisionmaking by the principal actors in the
economy, then both current policies and expectations 
about future policies will influence those actors’ decisions. 
Consider a football game. If painstaking data analysis
from, say, the 1990s reveals that the instances in which
teams gained the most yardage were on passing plays, would
it make sense for teams to drastically increase their number
of passing plays? A little reflection suggests that it probably
wouldn’t. Most opponents would alter their behavior to
defend against this change in strategy.
While seemingly unrelated to economic policy analysis,
this analogy teaches us that, one, the data are an outcome 
of optimization under a given policy regime, and, two, 
when policies change, so might behavior. This is a 
potentially serious problem for empirical work in 
macroeconomics. After all, in most cases we do not have 
the luxury of running highly controlled experiments on 
citizens to learn how they would respond. Instead, we must
be clever and insist that our models match observed 
behavior under current policy. Consequently, to predict 
how policies would alter outcomes, we must explicitly 
reanalyze household decisionmaking under a proposed 
policy, and then compare the results. The outcome of this
process thereby overcomes the thorny problem of using 
data to learn about the effects of proposed, but historically
novel, policy changes.
In contrast to a purely statistical analysis, an equilibrium
model is advantageous because it will deliver the full 
range of decisionmaking for all conceivable situations 
that may face households and firms. In turn, we can learn
more precisely what drives people to borrow, or save, or 
file for bankruptcy. We can also have a clearer view 
of how they might change their behavior if we 
changed policy.
So we return to the initial question: Why have consumer
default rates risen? Though the data alone may point to
other culprits, equilibrium analysis suggests that improve-
ments in lending technologies are a promising candidate for
explaining both borrowing and default behavior over the
past two decades, while mere reductions in “stigma” are not
able to match the data. In other words, it’s not shame that
drove the rise of bankruptcies, as neat of an explanation as
that would have been. Before you can understand the facts,
you first need a good theory. RF
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